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PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW'
Gustav Aschaffenburg

2

I ask my readers for their indulgence
for my lack of familiarity with many
American laws, procedures and institutions. Although I shall deal primarily
with the European methods of combatting the enemies of society, it is likely
that the difference between European
and American points of view on this
subject may not be too divergent.
In the relations between psychiatry
and criminal law the psychiatrist always faces a very difficult situation:
it is a common prejudice that the
psychiatrist tries to save as many criminals as possible from punishment.
Even in 1896 the high court of New
York declared: "It is generally safer
to take the judgment of unskilled
jurors than the opinion of hired and
generally biased experts." Though in
this audience this erroneous and dangerous opinion is not to be feared,-I
will nevertheless try to show the reasons for this attitude, because only if
we clearly recognize the sources of this
error can we hope to combat it
successfully.
First, there is the common aversion
against the mentally affected. Although
the character of mental disease was
recognized in an astonishing degree in
the centuries preceding the birth of
Christ, and the means of treatment
were approaching in many ways our

most modern points of view, all this
was changed profoundly in the Middle
Ages. An insane person was regarded
as one whose soul, in consequence of
his sins, was possessed by the devil.
The burning of witches, the last of
which occurred within the past 150
years, is a frightful expression of this
popular belief. Although this belief in
demoniacal possession has disappeared,
the after-effects are still observable.
A second cause of the prejudice is
to be found in the misapprehension of
most people as to the appearance of the
mentally ill person. Generally the layman thinks of an insane person as of one
who is extremely strange in his whole
behaviour, completely confused, incapable of being reasoned with,-in
fact a typical picture of an old schizophrenic. It always impressed me very
much to notice how surprised the students of medicine, as well as of law,
at my psychiatric demonstrations were
when brought to a modern mental
hospital. For over thirty years I have
found that even well educated people
when shown around in my clinic asked
me at the end of such a visit where
the excited patients were kept. They
never realized that the madman of
their imagination was but a rare
exception. From many conversations
with judges and from my experiences

1 Presented before the Staff of Saint Elizabeths
Hospital, Washington, D. C., February 19, 1940.
2 M.D., Dr. Jur. h. c.; Dr. Phil. h. c.; Research
Professor, The Catholic University of America,

Washington. D. C. Psychiatrist, Mount Hope
Retreat, Baltimore, Md.; former Director of the
Clinic for Nervous and Mental Diseases of the
University in Cologne.
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in the courts, I dare say that a real
understanding of the meaning of mental disease is often lacking even in
otherwise learned and experienced
judges. Better psychological training
and the judges' own experiences during
investigations and trials may, in the future give them an idea of the difficulties
of the problem of recognizing mental
abnormalities. But the situation is quite
desperate in all jury trials. Without entering into a discussion about the value
of such trials in general, there can be no
doubt that the layman, if not by chance
informed by experiences in his own family, faces our explanations with a complete inability to understand. Such
inability militates against the mentally
deranged offender.
Another reason that the aversion
against mental diseases still continues
is the enormous expense which they
entail. In Hamburg, for instance, a
great city of almost a million inhabitants and one of the richest cities of
Germany, in 1908 the expenses for the
insane, the feebleminded and the epileptics were higher than the whole
income of the town from its direct
taxes.
The last, and in my opinion the most
important point, is that it is not the
task of the judge to decide what has to
become of the sick person after he is
recognized as irresponsible. We physicians would resent it if after a careful
examination we had proposed some
therapy yet the application or non-application would be left to another
agency, not at all fit for it. We can
understand why also the judge hesitates to acquit an insane defendant

when he is not sure that his recommendation will be carried out. Many
judges are inclined not to accept the
opinion of the expert and prefer to
commit the accused to a jail because of
their feeling that a criminal insane person, dangerous to the community,
should not be allowed to menace society.
I have mentioned those general difficulties which we encounter, and will
consider now the reasons of a legislative
and executive nature. American courts
decide on the basis of precedents, while
European countries, with the exception
of Great Britain, have exactly codified
laws. Therefore the European lawyer
is perhaps better trained for logical and.
exact reasoning, although literal adherence to the text of law does not favor
adaptation to the changing development
of ethical views and social circumstances.
In Germany the same criminal law
has been valid since 1871 with the exception of the very important "Law
for Combatting Habitual Criminality"
and the "Law of Juvenile Courts." In
the paragraph dealing with irresponsibility the metaphysical expression
"freedom of will" was used until 1933,
thus forcing most of the experts to
sacrificium intellectus. For many decades in Germany and all countries
working out a new criminal law scientists have been trying to find a more
satisfying definition of the word: irresponsibility.
The paragraph that I formulated in
1908 and that has been used over Germany since 1933 runs thus: "He is not
punishable who in consequence of
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mental trouble, clouding of consciousness or feeblemindedness has not been
able to comprehend the wrongfulness
of his acts or to act in accordance with
his comprehension." The Swiss Criminal Law enacted last year follows the
same formulation.
The English and the American jurisdiction is based on the McNaghten
case: An insane person can be acquitted only if at the time of the act
he was not able to distinguish right or
wrong. This rule is valid in twentynine American states. A part of those
states keep close to the so-called right
and wrong-test, while others use the
Knowledge of nature and quality-test.
This jurisdiction has the basic fault
that a purely intellectual quality is
chosen as the standard of judgment.
I do not know how American experts
come to terms or compromise with this
rule in court, but in scientific discussion there will scarcely be found a defender for this overvaluation of the intellectual factor.
All our acts, including the acts of
sound people, are more influenced by
our emotions than by reasoning and
our intelligence, much more than our
self-esteem may concede. But in reality
we choose even our motives for our doing more by our emotivity than by cool
deliberation. The real motive power
of all our acts is affectivity. Those
who share this opinion will agree with
me that responsibility depends not
only on the possibility of reasoning, but
even more on the ability to resist temptations and wishes. I think, therefore,
that the German and Swiss definitions
of responsibility correlate best the

two aspects, namely, the intellectual
and the affective ones.
Almost simultaneously with the McNaghten test here in America the irresistible impulse test was introduced in
1884. The test is used, often in combination with the right and wrong test,
in seventeen states and in the District of Columbia. It is based on
the view that besides the intellectual
judgment there must also exist the
possibility to do what is considered
right and to abstain from doing
what is considered wrong. I think that
the expression irresistible impulse is
not well chosen. It supposes an irresistible impulse which is found in this
literal form only in the incomprehensible acts of confused epileptics, schizophrenics, paralytics and perhaps in
some cases of paranoid attacks. It
seems to be impossible to convince laymen that an irresistible impulse can
exist, although the patient is absolutely
clear and quiet, as we find it sometimes
in the form of murder as an initial
symptom in schizophrenia. On the other
hand, an insufficiently trained and inexperienced expert-may think that the
impulses of sexual offenders may be
regarded as irresistible.
Nobody will have the boldness to decide himself if a bridge is constructed
with sufficient consideration of all the
rules of mechanical engineering, yet in
cases of responsibility everybody believes that he is able to find the right
decision by himself and that he is able
to judge the personality of an accused.
In the case of the bridge every court
will certainly demand the help of an
expert. In the case of responsibility it
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may do so, but usually it does not.
The task of an expert is to help the
judge where the latter's own experience is insufficient to enable him to
form an opinion of his own. The judge
is not bound by the expert testimony;
he decides according to his own judgment, as the law provides. That is inevitable, because in case of differing
expert testimonies the judge should
be free to follow that which he
finds the most convincing. This fact
obliges us to formulate our opinion
so as to enable the judge to form
for himself an idea of the disease
and its consequences. I note in Dr.
Sheldon Glueck's writings, to which I
owe thanks for an abundance of knowledge and insight, that he is of the
opinion that the expert should merely
state the mental condition of the accused, abstaining from speaking about
the question whether the patient is able
to distinguish right or wrong; the latter
ought to be the task of the court. This
point of view is often expressed also
by judges. We must agree that we
cannot trust the understanding of
mental abnormalities of the courts, especially that of laymen. When the expert fails to express clearly his conviction, it seems to me that we put the
responsibility of answering the most
difficult question upon persons who by
training are wholly incompetent to
answer it. I cannot share the opinion
that we exceed our competence in stating that an accused could not discern
that his doing was wrong. I have acted
as expert in many courts in and out of
Germany, in nearly every case on summons of the courts; they never were

hurt by my expressing the conclusions
based on my observations. When once
in an extremely difficult case I tried to
leave the decision about the responsibility to the court, I was immediately
asked to complete my report given in
writing.
If I am well informed I must concede
that the German expert's duty differs
much from that of the American. This
finds its explanation perhaps already
in the entirely different task of the
prosecuting attorney. In Germany he
has to procure the material not only
for the confirmation of the criminal
charge but also for its disproval. The
court has to prove the guilt of the accused, not the accused his innocence.
This circumstance is of great importance in the question of irresponsibility. In Germany every offender
against the law is supposed to be responsible; but if he himself, his family,
the defender, the state's attorney or the
judge have any doubts as to his responsibility, the court is bound to prove it.
It is superfluous to mention, to you how
much simpler it is to establish an illness
than to exclude it. In my own reports
and in those written in my clinic under
my supervision we always chose the
words "no signs of a serious mental
disorder have been found." We carefully avoided saying that the examined
is sane. That would exceed what we
can do and are allowed to do.
In twenty-two of the United States
the burden of proving the mental disease is shifted upon the accused; in my
opinion this is an unbearable situation.
How can he possibly do so? Even
though he has a defender he cannot
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utilize the means of the state for procuring the necessary material for his
defense. Very often, too, the patient
himself lacks judgment of his own disease. In two other states it is doubtful
who has to prove the mental disease, but
nineteen states, the District of Columbia
and the Federal courts are of the opinion
that it is up to the prosecution to prove
the sanity of the defendant. Opinions are
divided as to how far the evidence
to prove sanity ought to go. The Supreme Court of Germany, the Reichsgericht, always stated that justified
doubts in responsibility must be valued
"in dubio pro reo." The surprising idea
that the accused should prove his irresponsibility himself forces the consultation of a private expert; this is a most
embarrassing situation, as it exposes,
as we have seen, the physician to the
suspicion of being purchased, even
3
though his opinion is given under oath.
Where the state is obliged to prove
the responsibility we can hope that in
time judges will be on tolerable or
even friendly terms with the experts.
Perhaps even the extremely low fee
will help in the same way. In Germany
uncomplicated cases are examined by

the court's experts. In more difficult
cases the offender is sent to a clinic or
a state hospital for a period of observation which may last not longer than
six weeks. Our results must be given
in writing. Even if the report consists
of 30, 50 or more pages, the maximum fee paid for official physicians is
only 30 marks, about 12 dollars. In
other words, if paid by the hour the
3In Germany the expert's oath differs from
the oath of witnesses: "I swear that I will give
my testimony impartially and conscientiously

maximum fee of the expert is often less
than the mihimum salary of anuntrained
workman. This is of great psychological importance because it protects the
expert against the suspicion that he is
financially interested.
Expert testimony is given to the
judge, the prosecuting and defending
attorneys, before trial; in this way
everyone has time to study it carefully
beforehand. During the trial the physician is not a witness, but an expert.
He must explain his opinion by word
of mouth. After his testimony is given
he is sometimes questioned about whatever may not be clear to the court, but
it is not usual to ask hypothetical questions. I have always refused to answer
such questions; neither have I ever
answered the question of the responsibility without making a personal examination. If the judge should not allow
observation at reqiest, this would be
without doubt a reason for reversing
the verdict.
In Massachussetts psychiatric investigation is necessary in all cases of
capital offenses and in cases of persons indicted for any other offense who
are known to have been previously indicted more than once or to have been
convicted of felony. (The so-called
Briggs Law, since 1929).
In America, only in California and
Indiana is the appointment of experts
by the court "mandatory" in all cases
where the issue of insanity is pleaded.
Other states may do so. But the Michigan and Illinois Supreme Courts have.
held it unconstitutional.
and according to my knowledge (sc. of the facts
and my science); May God help me."
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Summing up my experience as an
expert for nearly 50 years, I dare say
that many courts not only have gained
more understanding for expert opinions
but also more confidence in their objectiveness. We have succeeded in no
longer being looked upon as troublemakers of the trial but as welcome
advisers to the court.
In 1933 in Germany the idea of diminished responsibility was legally
adopted. It goes without saying that
there can be no sharply drawn line
between responsibility and irresponsibility by reason of mental disorder.
There is a kind of No Man's Land between the realms of responsibility and
irresponsibility. Thus the alienists and
many progressive criminologists for
many decades have asked for a law for
the cases of diminished responsibility.
It is a real tragedy that just when our
wishes were about to be realized, one
of our most outstanding alienists, Carl
Wilmanns, felt himself obliged to speak
against adopting it as a law. His reasons are the following:
1. The difficulty of diagnosis,
2. The much too great number of such
cases,
3. The impossibility of treating any case
according to its individuality.
These objections are justified, but they
constitute no bar to the legal acceptance of diminished responsibility. Wilmanns himself, in his very valuable
book, "Diminished Responsibility," has
quoted much material that proves irrefutably the existence of such states.
This fact is not to be denied. We must
try to overcome the difficulties. The
first argument can be eliminated by
providing for a better training of all

physicians, especially the court physicians, in psychiatry. As to the fear
that the number of cases of diminished
responsibility is too great, we may admit that there are many. But we do
not ignore cancer and tuberculosis because they are widespread! On the
contrary, that fact has spurred the physician to greater efforts to combat them.
In my opinion, the very fact that there
are so many cases of psychic abnormalities forces us to ask for the best methods of dealing with them. The most
impbrtant objection is the third, the
difficulty of treating these cases according to their individuality. This is a
difficult task that strains our knowledge; and all progress in diagnoses and
therapy will never prevent us of making
mistakes in the choice of our means.
Finally, in many cases any kind of
treatment will fail, even though new
methods should be available.
It is necessary to realize which personalities are troubling society and endangering it. We are obliged for this
purpose to schematize. But for this
audience I need not mention that it is
impossible to differentiate the groups
exactly; also, they often are combined.
a. The idiots, the insane and epileptics,
of whom but a relatively small part,
much smaller than generally supposed,
are socially dangerous, though they are
very troublesome for their surroundings.
b. The immature, mostly juveniles,
who on account of inferior constitution
or by lack of education are maladjusted
to life.
c. The drug addicts.
d. The sexually abnormal.
e. The borderline cases, who in part
belong to the group of diminished responsibility. They must be subdivided
as follows:
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be treated. Only some criteria should
1. The feeblemifided and morons,
2. The apathetic and dull,
be given to help us to discuss the best
3. The unstable.
ways to cope with those personalities.
The foregoing by their passive nature
We physicians are accustomed to recompose the great army that is harmful
for society; there are beggars, vaga- gard not the particular illness but the
bonds, prostitutes, many occasional offenders, many thieves, but also many sick person. -The same treatment may
sexual offenders, persons mostly without be useful in one case but without any
any real criminal tendencies and often effect in another one, and harmful, perwell .meaning. But by their lack of
case. To an even
energy, their insufficient judgment and haps lethal, in a third
above all their incapacity for resist- higher degree the treatment of mental
ing temptation, they are led into crim- disorders depends on the whole perinality and often relapse. Wetzel has em- sonality. We must individualize. Many
ployed the phrase: "habitually occasional
criminals." Strange as it may sound at an insane person is harmless, while
the first hearing, it aptly describes their others suffering from the same form of
mentality and what we can expect of mental diseases are very dangerous. It
them.
4. The hotheaded and excitable, who is quite the same with those of diminby their readiness for explosions (short- ished responsibility. Here is the princircuits reactions) form the chief con- Icipal source of the opposition to legal
tingent of criminals by impulsive and
rules for the cases of diminished reuncontrolled emotion.
5. The brutal, who differ from the last sponsibility. As long as the point of
group by their missing sound affectivity view is that punishment has to be a
and are near the following group:
just equivalent for a committed crime,
6. The affectively and the morally
insensible, whose egotism is at any mo- the consequence is: lower punishment
ment dangerous for the community. (In for lower guilt. But experience shows
enumerating these subgroups I do not that on account of mental inferiorpretend that there will be often a case
of irresponsibility, nor do I think that ity the person of diminished responsibility is often extremely dangerous for
it regards the last subgroup)
7. The antisocial, who is more or less the community. For this reason the
identical with the professional criminal. psychiatrists have long asked that diHe is the notorious enemy of the community. It is impossible to say whether minished responsibility should not at
the egotism of such active personalities is all mean diminishing of punishment
the greater danger or their hardminded- but an adaptation to the special perness against the interests and the sufsonality of the criminal. Every other
fering of other people.
This picture is unharmonious and solution would be a return to a simple
entangling. But my intention has been retaliation-theory, and neglects the real
only to outline which personalities and aim of criminal law.
Within the limited time of my lecture
which prevalent qualities of mind are
not thoroughly discuss the ultiI
can
dangerous or harmful for the community. This enumeration of maladjusted mate aim of criminal law. I conpersons is not an instruction for diag- fine myself to what is necessary to
nosis and surely not a way to find a prove that our wishes are not in conprescription how every group should tradiction to its ultimate scope. Orig-
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inally criminal law issued from the necessity to replace the arbitrariness and
the exaggerations of individual revenge
by appropriate measures of the clan,
and later the community. But soon the
aim to protect society was added. Even
centuries before Christ the question
was discussed that the Dutch Hugo
Grotius has formulated as follows:
"Are we punishing quia peccatum
est or ne peccetur?" A punishment
for a committed crime can only be
approved if we can retaliate justly. But
how measure the guilt, if there is a
deep gulf between the criminal's intention and his actual deeds? Very often
the consequences of a crime exceed by
far what the criminal intended to do.
But not less often the criminal does not
accomplish what he had in mind to
carry out, because of unforeseen interference. But supposing we could find a
balance for the discrepancy between
the objective and the subjective guilt,
it surpasses all human aptitude to find
the just expiation. In Germany even
prominent adherents of an unrestricted
retaliation-theory have conceded that
measuring of punishment may be arbitrary "and depends more on the disposition and even on the digestion of
the judge than on actual insight into
the criminal's guilt." As deep as ever
the want for revenge may dwell in mankind, but the chief task of criminal law
is: protecting decent and law-abiding
people against the attacks of the criminals. More and more this opinion is
being generally adopted, thanks to the
work of Lombroso and the influence of
the idea that not the crime should be
regarded as important but the criminal

himself. In 1876 Cesare Lombroso published his book: "Trattato antropologico sperimentale dell 'uomo delinquente." Lombroso claimed that a
great number of people-according to
his own judgment one-third of all criminals-are born criminals, deliquenti
nati; even when living in a good position and well educated, those persons
can not live honestly. Furthermore,
Lombroso claimed that those people
could be recognized by signs of degeneration.
The present generation will hardly
realize the uproar, the storm of indignation, created all over the world. .It
was easy enough to find some mistakes
and exaggerations in Lombroso's theory. Lombroso was, as his daughter
has said, "Although a scientist, also a
poet." Perhaps he was a poet rather
than a cautious and scrutinizing scientist. The idea that we could recognize
the rei nati by somatic and psychic abnormalities was erroneous; and his
auxiliary hypotheses that the born
criminal is an atavistic form of human
being, and that his personality was like
that of children, epileptics and primitive tribes, was not justified. But his
observation was correct: There are
many individuals whose mental makeup prevents them from living the life
of a peaceful citizen.
Twenty years later Ferri published
his work: "The Crime as a Social
Symptom." Though in it he accused -society, which means all of us as members of the community, as guilty for the
existence of criminality, no indignation
was aroused. Nor was it when Kretschmer claimed that everyone's personality
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was predestined by his special somatic
type, as asthenic, pyknic, and so on;
this opinion was discussed objectively,
as well as Johannes Lange's statement,
that the reaction of identical twins was
practically identical. Lange created for
this phenomenon the formula: "Crime
as Fate." We cannot doubt where this
change of mind has come from. The
doctrine of Lombroso has deeply affected the general opinion and shaken
our belief that we would be able to
bring out expiation justly; it thus
has influenced the fundamentals of
criminal law. The idea that not the
committed act is of importance but
the criminal himself, was too natural
and too well founded to be repressed
any longer, and soon it was recognized
that we are by no means delivered
defenseless to the criminal. On the contrary, just this attitude offers better
weapons for real protection of the community. We need a number of effective
methods of dealing with dangerous
people and we do not neglect punishment as a means in appropriate cases.
Criminologists expect a two-fold effect
of criminal law, namely, a general preventive effect, and a special preventive
one. The first aims to prevent
criminal action through the certainty
that it will find its punishment. The
question as to what extent this is true,
cannot be proved by statistics. Capital
punishment, which was inflicted for
thefts of any kind and also for minor
offenses in the Middle Ages, failed to
prevent them. Also the fact that the
number of first offenders has been increasing year by year shows that the
effect of the general preventive influ-

ence of the criminal law should not be
overestimated. I believe neveitheless
that stamping an action as a criminal
deed has an educative influence.
The special preventive effect should
work in the criminal himself, who
should be prevented by punishment
from relapsing into crime. The statistical proof shows that this hope is not
justified under the existing circumstances. The higher the number of
former punishments, the quicker the
recidivism. We may not overlook the
fact that very often the penalty is
merely an imprisonment for a certain
length of time, lacking any educative
value, and too seldom is an attempt
made to influence and to reform the
guilty person during imprisonment.
The effect of the punishment can never
be anticipated, because the judge has
hardly sufficient time during the trial
nor sufficient psychological training to
be able to ascertain the personality of
the criminal. Furthermore, he has no
influence on the treatment of the convicted person once sent to prison. The
main reason for our skepticism concerning punishment is to be found in
the very personality of the criminal.
When I was physician in a prison -I
Examined 200 men convicted of sexual
offenses. All had been found by
the courts to be guilty and responsible
for their actions. Among these I found
44 to be undoubtedly insane and irresponsible. In 6 cases it could not be
stated whether the later disease had
already developed at the date of the
crime. 35 cases were border-line, 16
cases were of diminished responsibility.
Among the remaining 99 only 45 per-
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sons, equal to 22.5%, could be considered as normal individuals. I choose
the word "normal" rather generously,
as you may be convinced if I mention
that among that group I found 12 cases
in which alcohol had been a factor in
the crime. My idea that sexual offenses
are likely to be committed more frequently by abnormal personalities than
are other crimes such as assault, robbery or theft, was erroneous. This leads
to the conclusion that we should not
be too optimistic, and furthermore that
we ought to be very careful in the
choice of four methods of dealing with
these maladjusted personalities. The
general point of view is, in a few
words: As long as we can hope to reform the criminal we must try to do it.
The incorrigibles must be prevented
from endangering society further by
committing him to prison or other appropriate institutions, if necessary for
life. The mentally abnormal must be
treated; if not recovered but still dangerous he should remain in a hospital.
An attempt has been made by lawyers as well as by some alienists to
differentiate between insane criminals
and the criminal insane, and in some
laws the measures differ according to
whether the ill person belongs to the
first or the second group. In fact this
differentiation is wrong and inappropriate. A person living in easy circumstances is much less likely to commit
a crime; should he become mentally
disturbed and troublesome for others
he will be sent to a mental hospital,
and no judge will have a chance. to
deal with him. If such a man has already committed a crime, his family

will ask for an expert. The patient will
be considered as criminally insane.
But, if the mental disease has been
overlooked by the court and is discovered later in the prison-as it often
happens-the offender is treated as an
insane criminal. It is a strange fact
that in England the insane criminal is
better treated than the criminal insane.
The insane criminal is usually sent to
a local mental hospital and must be
committed to it if he has served his
sentence, but the criminally insane offender is committed "during His Majesty's pleasure" to the institute for
criminal insane at Broadmoor. He can
be discharged only by the Home Office
which generally decides according to
the act the patient has committed. In
consequence, in Broadmoor, as well as
in Dundrum, the Irish institute for
criminal insane, I found that most
of the inmates were found "guilty
but insane" of murder and manslaughter, while sexual offenders, who are so
much more likely to relapse, are rarely
found there. The objection to this differentiation lies in the fact that the illness is regarded as an unchangeable
state, whereas really the symptoms are
inconstant, and with the symptoms the
behavior of the ill personality against
society changes. The sick person becomes more or less dangerous according to either improvement or aggravation of his disease. Thus this differentiation between insane criminal and
criminal insane gives a totally wrong
impression of the patient's real state
of mind. It is useless and misleading
to look back on the deed; it is necessary
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to look forward to the possibilities of
future acts which may endanger society.
I cannot insist at this time on enumerating the ways of individualization
of the methods of treating dangerous
and troublesome people. Nor does time
allow me to discuss all the desirable
methods of preventing crime by combatting abuse of drugs, eliminating the
dangerous influence of certain kinds of
movies and detective stories, the danger of slums, and so on.
In closing I prefer to mention only
some of our most important tasks as
alienists:
1. Better instruction and training
of the physicians in psychiatry. Neither
in Europe nor in America have we
enough adequately trained and experienced physicians with knowledge of
psychiatry. Only those with a profound
special training in psychiatry should be
allowed to give expert testimony, as it
is proposed here in America. Nor
should physicians for prisons and reformatories be appointed who have no
special experience in psychiatry.
2, In Germany health officers are
obliged before being appointed to
work at least four months in a mental
hospital. Even the association of health
officers has pleaded for a one-year
training. There is no doubt that they
need at least two years.
3. We psychiatrists introduced in
all German universities practical courses
where legal questions are discussed
in connection with psychiatric problems and where cases of mental

diseases are demonstrated. 4 These lectures are for medical as well as for law
students. The medical students have
far outnumbered the law students.
Sometimes even judges and attorneys
were more numerous than students
of law. During these demonstrations
the judge has ample opportunity to discuss his own opinion, and therefore
both physicians and lawyers learn
to compare their differing views.
I do not share the fear that after such
courses the judge may believe that he
has gained sufficient experience to be
an expert himself. My experience is
just to the contrary: By acquiring profound understanding of the great difficulties in judging abnormal personalities and in searching the best way to
treat them, the judge will gladly acknowledge really qualified experts and
will ask for their opinions.

4In
Bonn the criminologist Graf zu Dohna
joined the psychiatrists in those courses.
5 Such lectures have been given during the
last decade in Germany and Austria also by the

criminologists von Hentig (Giessen, now Colorado University), Lenz (Graz) and Graf Gleispach (Vienna).

The best method for instruction would
be a kind of clinical demonstration, "' not
only for physicians and lawyers, but
also for wardens and guards of prisons,
Bortsal institutions, houses of correction and reformatories, for probation
officers as well as for social workers
and teachers. The lecturer might well
present trustworthy records about hereditary factors, development at home,
in school and in social contacts, occupation, environment and habits, as well
as concerning the intelligence and affectivity of the demonstrated person. Then
he may discuss, as we do in our clinics,
the anamnesis, the diagnosis, the prognosis and the therapy. I would even
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like to enlarge this idea in asking that chiatrists and everyone who has to deal
also mentally sound persons might be with abnormal and dangerous personalities. It would provide us with new
demonstrated.
Such education for a deep insight into experience for the fight against crimihuman personalities would enable a nality by more appropriate laws and by
better understanding and would guaran- more efficient means of reforming the
tee a better cooperation between psy- offender and of preventing crime.
My object all sublime
I shall achieve in timeTo make the punishment fit the crime.
-William S. Gilbert.
The generality of men are naturally
apt to be swayed by fear rather than by
reverence, and therefore to refrain from
evil rather because of the penalty that
it brings than because of its own foulness.-Aristotle, Ethics, X, 9, 1.
Offenses are not to be measured by
the issue of the events, but rather by
the bad intentions of the offenders.
-Cicero, Letters, IV, 8.
We are mad, not only individually,
but nationally. We check isolated manslaughters and murders; but what of
war, the much - esteemed crime of
slaughtering whole peoples?
-- Seneca, Epistles, 95, 30.
The right (i.e., the power secured by
social recognition) of free life in every
man rests on the assumed capacity in
every man of free action contributory to

social good ("free" in the sense of determined by the idea of a common good.
Animals may and do contribute to the
good of man, but not thus "freely").
This right on the part of associated men
implies the right on their part to prevent
such actions as interfere with the possibility of free action contributory to
social good. This constitutes the right
of punishment,- the right so far to use
force upon a person (to treat him as an
animal or a thing) as may be necessary
to save others from this interference.
-Thomas Hill Green, professor of
Moral Philosophy at Oxford University, "Principles of Political Obligation," chap. L, Works, vol. II, p. 486.
All those who have given intelligent
consideration to the subject are convinced that the most efficient means of
preventing crime and reforming those
who have violated 'a criminal law is to
be found in a PROBATION system that
is at once kindly and sane.
-George Gordon Battle.
An ounce of PROBATION is worth a
pound of prison.--Sanford Bates.

